More Rising Compensation for Executives at Financially Challenged Hospitals, Justified by More Talking Points

In the spring, leaves turn green, and executive compensation turns greener.  The media has provided another set of stories about the inexorable rise of compensation for executives of non-profit hospitals, presented in order of the stories' appearance.

Westchester Medical Center

The Journal-News reported in April,

A Journal News analysis of salary data, obtained through a Freedom of Information request, revealed that 20 hospital administrators received increases in their total compensation for 2010, including one employee whose pay package jumped 18 percent.

Also,

The newspaper’s analysis of data for 2010, the latest year available, shows that 26 administrators at the medical center would have exceeded Gov. Andrew Cuomo’s limit of $199,000 a year for executive compensation. Cuomo signed an order, scheduled to take effect April 15, that restricts the amount of state money that nonprofit organizations can use toward salaries and benefits.

Overall, the medical center spent $11.8 million in compensation to 44 executives in 2010, during which three administrators resigned and three others had their titles downgraded to the director level. The executive payroll rose 11 percent between 2008 and 2010.

In particular,

Administrators who received increases in their total compensation included CEO Israel, who earned the top salary of $1.3 million in total compensation; the chief financial officer; an executive vice president and several senior vice presidents.

However, the fortunes of the top executives were rising at a time of financial trouble for the institution:

That same year, the medical center laid off 130 workers, instituted a hiring freeze and announced an $18 million budget cut for the following year.

'There is no shared sacrifice, there is no appearance of a shared sacrifice,' said Jayne Cammisa, a union representative and a registered nurse in the hospital’s transplant unit.

Those who defended the executives' compensation sounded familiar themes:

Hospital boards rely on compensation committees, outside consultants and market analysis and documentation to justify how much they pay administrators. The medical center uses an outside firm to analyze compensation packages, which are based on market values, [Senior Vice President for Communications Kara] Bennorth said.

The only way to keep the institution and be financially viable is you have to have top management,' [Chairman of the Board Mark] Tulis said.

Note that we briefly mentioned the CEO's compensation in this post.

Connecticut

In May, the Hartford Courant reported,

The health care system may be ailing, but newly compiled data show that compensation for top executives at Connecticut hospitals remains healthy.

Eighteen executives at the state's 30 hospitals made more than $1 million in 2009-10, according to information the hospitals reported to the Internal Revenue Service.

Some of the more notable examples included,

Hartford Hospital's outgoing chief executive officer, John J. Meehan, was the highest paid in Connecticut and one of the highest paid nationally. His compensation totaled $6.98 million – all but $1.1 million of it nontaxable and retirement benefits, according to the hospital.

Also,

In addition to Meehan, Connecticut's 10 highest paid administrators were two Yale-New Haven Health System executives, the departing CEOs at the Hospital of Central Connecticut and the Hospital of St. Raphael, the departing treasurer of Hartford Hospital, the treasurer of the Hospital of Central Connecticut and the presidents of Stamford, Yale-New Haven and St. Francis Hospital and Medical Center. All made more than $1.59 million in 'reportable' W-2 and 1099 miscellaneous compensation.

A few executives had significant 'non-reportable' compensation in addition to W-2 and 1099 pay. The outgoing president at William Backus Hospital in Norwich had $2.2 million in deferred compensation related to his retirement, for total pay of nearly $3 million, according to a C-HIT analysis of the data. The chief operating officer at the Hospital of Central Connecticut had $472,443 in reportable pay and $838,880 in other compensation, for a total of $1.3 million.

Again, there were complaints that executive compensation had nothing to do with the performance of the executives' organizations,

'I don't understand what the hospitals are getting for their money. Some of the highest paid are the worst performing,' said Ellen Andrews, executive director of the Connecticut Health Policy Project in New Haven. 'The system isn't working for anyone – for the state, for the hospitals or for consumers.'

Note, however, that the system is working for the top hired executives.

In response to these complaints, the Courant cited the usual defenses of executive pay:

Others say the compensation reflects the complexity of the health care business, keen national competition for good leaders, and the uncertain future that executives face when they sign on for top-level positions in an industry undergoing enormous change. Pay needs to be competitive to attract and retain key executives, they say – even for nonprofits that are struggling to find their place.

'Hospital executives are responsible for extremely complex organizations,' said Michele Sharp of the Connecticut Hospital Association. In addition to managing advanced medical services and technology, a skilled staff and extensive physical plants, hospital CEOs are often responsible for an array of services beyond the hospital, such as primary care clinics, home health organizations and surgery centers. They work in a highly regulated environment and must comply with demanding standards in areas that range from patient safety and financial performance to institutional stability and community health, Sharp said.

'When you bring in exceptional talent, you can manage effectively and efficiently,' said Vin Petrini, senior vice president for public affairs atYale-New Haven Hospital. 'It's a very complicated and complex industry. We need to be thoughtful about how we manage and retain and recruit talent.'

Wake Forest Baptist

The Winston-Salem Journal uncovered the compensation of several local executives,

A commitment Wake Forest Baptist Medical Center made to Dr. John McConnell, its chief executive, when he was recruited led to a nearly 50 percent increase in his total compensation for fiscal year 2010-11, the center reported Tuesday.

McConnell was paid almost $2.5 million in total compensation, compared with $1.68 million for fiscal 2009-10.

The total included essentials such $25,560 for moving expenses and $9,568 for country club dues.

Other executives did well too:

Donny Lambeth, former president of N.C. Baptist Hospital, had a 36 percent increase in total compensation to $1.16 million. Lambeth now serves as president of Davie County Hospital and Lexington Medical Center. His salary dropped 11 percent to $537,997, while his bonus and incentive compensation rose 165 percent to $186,261.

Dr. Thomas Sibert, president of Wake Forest Baptist Health and chief operating officer, received a 2 percent increase in total compensation to $995,133, including $545,517 in salary and $166,027 in bonus and incentive compensation. Sibert took over his role in September 2010.

Edward Chadwick, chief financial officer, received a 32 percent increase in total compensation to $974,587. His salary rose 71 percent to $503,663 in salary, while his bonus and incentive compensation fell 42 percent to $200,000.

Dr. William Applegate, retired president of Wake Forest University Health Sciences and dean of its medical school, was paid $743,541 in total compensation, down 25 percent. His salary dropped 3 percent to $518,231, while his bonus and incentive compensation fell from $378,900 to $99,900.

Doug Edgeton, former president of Piedmont Triad Research Park, received a 38 percent decrease in total compensation to $655,048. His salary fell 1 percent to $484,360, and his bonus and incentive compensation fell from $361,600 to $111,700.

However, a Winston-Salem Journal article in April noted that the same CEO, Mr McConnell would be aggressively cutting costs and possibly laying off employees:

Wake Forest Baptist Medical Center has told employees it is considering reducing its workforce as part of a major initiative aimed at improving patient outcomes at a lower cost.

The center confirmed Friday a memo sent April 2 by Dr. John McConnell, its chief executive, which addressed what the center is calling 'accelerated transformational initiatives.'

In particular,

In a separate statement, the center said it is looking at expense-reduction opportunities that include 'energy conservation, cost savings through supply chain management, revenue-cycle improvements, efficiencies such as reducing length of stay, reduction in discretionary spending, and managed employment through attrition, retirements, eliminating duplication and process redesign.'

"Managed employment" seems to be the latest circumlocution for layoffs.

The largess given to top executives at a time when lesser employees may be sacked was explained by trotting out the usual suspects,

Wake Forest Baptist said the center is a 'very complex organization that requires a special set of skills and experience to manage relationships with physicians and researchers, the university, its patients and community.'

I wonder if "complexity" comes from a set of talking points, since it gets aired so often in this context.

Note that we discussed compensation given to Wake Forest executives the year before, and its relationship, or lack thereof to the quality of their leadership here.

Summary

There they go again. We have the latest additions to what has become a long series of examples of executive exceptionalism in health care organizations. Top hired executives, be they of for-profit health care corporations, or non-profit organizations, tend to be paid very well, even when their organizations perform poorly or are financially threatened.

The same rationales are cited repeatedly to justify their treatment. Executives are said to have very difficult jobs, Competitive pay is necessary to hire the brilliant people required.  Left unsaid, however, is how difficult these managerial positions are in comparison to the demanding work and sometimes life or death responsibilities of health professionals, how brilliant executives are in comparison to such well trained professionals, and why the exdcutives deserve competitive pay when other employees may be laid off. Perhaps the close ties of those making the arguments to the executives explains the questions they beg.

So it is time to say it again,....  Health care organizations need leaders that uphold the core values of health care, and focus on and are accountable for the mission, not on secondary responsibilities that conflict with these values and their mission, and not on self-enrichment. Leaders ought to be rewarded reasonably, but not lavishly, for doing what ultimately improves patient care, or when applicable, good education and good research. On the other hand, those who authorize, direct and implement bad behavior ought to suffer negative consequences sufficient to deter future bad behavior.


If we do not fix the severe problems affecting the leadership and governance of health care, and do not increase accountability, integrity and transparency of health care leadership and governance, we will be as much to blame as the leaders when the system collapses.

A Conference on the Psychology of Deception and Unethical Behavior

The Deception, Incentives and Behavior Conference at the Rady School of Management, University of California - San Diego, was attended by over 100 people, including me, indicating that there is real interest in studying deception and unethical behavior in the real world. 

Several presentations had implications for health care, summarized below by theme (titles of presentations follow entries in parentheses).

Context

Several presentations discussed how context affects peoples' inclination to be honest or dishonest. 

Alexander Cappelan,  Norwegian School of Economics, showed evoking a market context, that is, asking people to think about buying or selling something, increased dishonesty, while a personal or intuitive context decreased dishonesty (When do people tell white lies?).

John List, University of Chicago, USA, gave the first plenary talk, suggesting that simply reminding charity fund raisers about the mission of their organization decreased their likelihood of stealing contributions.

Shahar Ayal, Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, Israel, suggested that when people can present themselves as ethical, sometimes extremely, maybe harshly ethical in one context, they may then act unethically in another context. (Moral cleansing strategies for ethical dissonance.)

Erin Krupka, University of Michigan, suggested that the availability of voluntary regulation may increase cheating: those who do not cheat may volunteer for regulation, while those who do cheat may point to the availability of regulation. (License to cheat: voluntary regulation and ethical behavior.)

Chen-Bo Zhong, University of Toronto, Canada suggested that being able to delegate increases the likelihood of deception (Deception: an unintended consequence of delegation.)

Keith Murningham, Kellogg School of Management, suggested that priming people by asking them to perform mathematical calculations increases lying, while priming them by reminders about social awareness or family values does not. (The social and ethical consequences of a calculative mindset.)

Incentives

Several  presentations suggested various ways in which incentives may affect honesty.

David Cooper, Florida State University, USA, suggested that the need for long-term credibility may decrease lying.  (Managing credibility: an experiment in leadership and coordination.)

Jan Potters, Tilburg University, Netherlands, suggested that increasing size of incentives to advisors increases the likelihood of their dishonesty when giving advice. (Disclosing advisors' interests neither helps nor hurts.)

Anastasia Danilov, University of Cologne, Germany, suggdsted that people who get incentives as part of a team who identify most strongly with the team are more likely to lie.  (The dark side of team identity: expermiental evidence from financial service professionals.)

Bill Nielson, University of Tennessee, USA, suggested that people will respond to short-term incentives even at the cost of long-term outcomes. (Temptation, learning and backward induction in sequential decision tasks.)

Michael Vlassopoulos, University of Southampton, UK, suggested that people who get random bonuses, that is, whose incentives are not clearly tied to particular outcomes, are more likely to cheat employers.  (The impact of bonuses on effort provision and cheating.) 

Lisa Ordonez, University of Arizona, USA, suggested that basing incentives on achievement of short-term goals (pay for performance) increases lying about performance. (The impact of goals on ethical behavior.)

Conflicts of Interest

Two presenations discussed conflicts of interest and its effects.

Jan Potters (see above) also found that disclosure of payments to advisors did not not lead them to give more honest advice.

Miriam Mezger, University of Cologne, Germany, presented a poster that suggested that when people must make decisions based on a mixture of advice from unbiased lay-people and conflicted individuals who do not disclose their conflicts, addition of advice from unbiased experts leads to better decisions.(Can experts reduce the impact of deceptive ratings on the internet? - an experiment on product choice with recommendations by managers and experts.)

Summary

The enthusiasm and level of intellectual engagement at the meeting suggested the importance of this field.  However, it was disappointing, but not surprising that the attendance at this meeting did not suggest this topic is yet of concern in health care.  Although the opening remarks by the Dean of the Rady School included a call for participation by people from health care, and other fields such as environmental science, I may have been the only person attending with a health care affiliation. 

Health care could benefit from increased attention to deception, dishonesty and unethical conduct in the field, how it happens, and what can be done to prevent it.  However, as we have often suggested, discussion of such topics is often anechoic because its capacity to offend or threaten those who most benefit from the status quo in health care. 

It was striking that presentations suggested that many practices in our current US commercialized, business-focused health care system may be leading to increased dishonesty and other unethical behavior.  These include thinking about health care in business and quantitative contexts, not in the context of the health care mission to help patients and the public, focus and incentives based on short-term goals, often revenue, and acceptance of conflicts of interest as inevitable and necessary to increase innovation.

Of course, these particular ideas may not make many of our current health care leaders happy.

They do suggest that we could improve honesty and ethics in health care by reminding peole with decision-making authority of the centrality of the health care mission, and the need to improve patients' and the public's health, and to de-emphasize focus and incentives on short-term goals, particularly financial ones.  We also ought to try to minimize, not just tolerate and "manage" conflicts of interest.

The 2011 Best Paid US CEO's Company's Latest Legal Settlement

Yet another legal settlement illustrates the contrast between rewards given to the hired managers of large health organizations and their organizations' performance. 

The New Settlement

The legal settlement in question was simple, as reported by Reuters,

McKesson Corp, one of top U.S. drug wholesalers, has agreed to pay more than $190 million to settle claims that it had violated the federal False Claims Act by reporting inflated pricing information for many prescription drugs, causing Medicaid to overpay for them.

The settlement was announced Thursday by U.S. Attorney Paul Fishman in New Jersey.

According to the government, McKesson reported inflated pricing data to First DataBank, a publisher of drug prices that most state Medicaid programs use to set payment rates for pharmaceutical products.

The government accused McKesson of marking up prices on a variety of drugs by 25 percent between Aug. 1, 2001, and March 31, 2005.

It said McKesson's conduct had caused the United States and individual states to pay inflated reimbursements on Medicaid claims submitted between Aug. 1, 2001 and Dec. 31, 2009.

'We have no tolerance for those who take advantage of that system to bring in more business by falsely increasing reimbursements to retailers,' Fishman said in a statement.

As is typical, the company denied doing anything wrong:

McKesson was not immediately available to comment.

According to settlement papers, McKesson 'expressly denies' the government's charges, as well as those of a whistleblower, David Morgan, in a related civil lawsuit filed in New Jersey federal court. The San Francisco-based company did not admit liability or wrongdoing in agreeing to settle.

It was hardly McKesson's first ethical problem.

McKesson's Track Record

This is just the latest in a long series of legal problems for this company.

The Depression-Era Scandal

Way back in 1938, there was the McKesson & Robbins scandal, one of the major scandals of the depression era. The company had been taken over by one Philip Musica, an accused bootlegger, who committed suicide before a trial (see this post).

In this century, there were:

The Securities Fraud Case

As we posted in 2009, five former executives pleaded guilty, the former CEO and Chairman Charles McCall was convicted of fraud in 2009. The company settled investor lawsuits in 2005 for $960 million.

The First Pharmaceutical Pricing Case

As the Wall Street Journal reported in 2009,

McKesson Corp., a giant drug-wholesale and -distribution company, agreed to pay $350 million to settle cases in which it was accused of helping to increase drug prices in 2001 and 2002. The money will go to health plans that pay for drugs and consumers who paid co-pays for their medicines.

The San Francisco-based company said the settlement, which is subject to court approval, includes 'an express denial of liability of any kind' but that it decided to settle the cases to avoid the uncertainty of litigation

In addition, as we noted here, the company settled with the state of Connecticut for "illegal and deceptive" pricing practices for a mere $15 million.

These settlements appear to be precursors of the just announced one.

The Propofolol Punitive Damages

As we noted here, McKesson was one of three companies to collectively pay $162 million in punitive damages in a case involving allegations that the companies sold propofolol, an injectable anesthetic, in reusable containers that were susceptible to contamination with the hepatitis C virus.

The Best-Paid CEO in America

All these legal issues notwithstanding, late in 2011, McKesson leadership made headlines for a different reason. Based on one method of computation, the company's CEO was the best-paid of an exceedingly well-paid 2011 CEO class. An article in the Daily Beast noted:

John Hammergren, [is] the CEO of the McKesson Corp., a giant medical-supply company in California. Hammergren is the $145 million man, top dog on the latest listing of the country’s highest-paid chief executives.

The details of the compensation package included,

Yet last year McKesson contributed more than $13 million just to Hammergren’s pension, according to company documents. Among the other perks he enjoys: a chauffeur to drive his company car, free use of the corporate jet for personal travel, and an extra $17,000 a year to pay for a financial planner because handling all those hundreds of millions is no doubt complicated stuff.

Also,

Then there are the assorted perks he gets each year at an annual cost of $1 million or so. Choose the perk that makes you the most jealous. Maybe it’s this line found in McKesson’s most recent proxy statement: 'For security, protection, and privacy reasons, the Board has directed our CEO to use the corporate aircraft for both business and private travel.' Or maybe it’s the bounty that awaits Hammergren on the other side of his retirement. The company discontinued its pension program for ordinary employees in 1997 but not for top executives. If Hammergren quit tomorrow, according to company filings, he would receive a pension valued at $125 million.

The party won’t stop once the 52-year-old Hammergren retires. Among his lifetime benefits: a personal assistant and office, which the company figures will cost more than $200,000 a year, and the services of a financial counselor—a perk that will eat up $350,000 in profits, according to company estimates. The goodies keep coming even after he dies. If his wife survives him, she will continue receiving his base salary for six months and will also get $2 million in cash. That cash bonus would actually cost the company nearly twice that amount, as it's promised to cover the widow’s cost of paying taxes on that money.

And then there’s a provision so outsize it’s drawn the attention of corporate-governance watchdogs like GMI, the research group that put Hammergren in the top spot of its latest survey of CEO salaries. If Hammergren loses his job due to a change in ownership, he receives an immediate $469 million payout, GMI found—giving him perverse incentive to see it happen.

Although Mr Hammergren has not been the best paid CEO every year, the Daily Beast article showed how much he has made over the years:

Hammergren’s annual total compensation payouts, taken from the company’s public filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission: $46 million in 2011; $55 million in 2010; $37 million in 2009; another $41 million in 2008. Hammergren hadn’t founded the company. Wall Street analysts covering McKesson can tell you of the disappointments and miscues that have marked his tenure. But his haul in the 13 years he has been running McKesson? More than $500 million, according to data provided by Equilar, an executive-compensation data firm.

It then contrasted this consistent largess, spiced with the 2011 results, with the company's long-term financial performance. After the scandal that eventually resulted in crimincal convictions for some McKesson executives:

'They had to give the CEO job to somebody, and basically he was the last man standing,' said an analyst who has been covering McKesson and its competitors since the 1990s. Many in the industry had never heard of Hammergren when he took over as president and co-CEO in 1999, this analyst said, 'but I guess it’s better to be lucky than good.' Hammergren became sole CEO in 2001.

McKesson’s stock had hit a high of just under $95 a share but fell below $20 after the scandal broke. Hammergren deserves credit for stabilizing the company—some might even say he rescued McKesson—but a long-term shareholder could be forgiven for feeling that the company’s board of directors has been overly generous to its chief executive. As of Friday, the stock was trading at $78 a share—still off its 1998 high. Factoring in the regular dividends the company has paid over the years, a shareholder’s investment would be worth slightly more than it was 13 years ago.

Summary

So Mr Hammergren's corpulent compensation is vastly out of proportion not only to the company's woeful ethical performance, but also to the long-term wealth created for its owners, that is, its shareholders.

So McKesson provides just the latest example of how the top hired leaders of health care organizations seem to monumentally prosper no matter how badly their organizations fare in terms of ethical performance, good done for patients and health care, or long-term financial performance. (See recent examples here and here, and our posts on executive compensation here.)  As we quoted a McGill economics professor who was writing about the global financial collapse, "all this compensation madness is not about markets or talents or incentives, but rather about insiders hijacking established institutions for their personal benefit."

To truly reform health care, we must stop this compensation madness. We must make health care leaders accountable for their organizations' effects on patients' and the public's health, and make sure they get reasonable, not royal compensation reasonably related to their organizations' performance, including ethical performance.